Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

West Valley City v. Dennis L. Streeter : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Robert K. Heineman; Brooke C. Wells; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, West Valley City v. Dennis L. Streeter, No. 930206 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5085

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

I' I"! I IK ,'!T "II'.'E O F U T A H

THE STATE OF UT ' ,11,
PiaJ I:LI". i I 11/Appellee,
v.
:

DAVID

Case No 930206-CA
P r i o r i t y No, 2

I.)e £ e t id a 11L / Appe 11. ci.ii L

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal
assault,
103

from

.. j u d g m e n t

a 3ld degree felony,

(1390)

r

Lake C o u n t y ,

arid c o n v i c t i o n

for

aggravated

i n v i o l a t i o n of U t a h Code Ann, tf 7(->-5-

in t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t

Court

Ml .'ill e nil" 111 nih,, I hp TTonov iih'l o ilnhin

i n and f o r
\

I "i ill' i r h ,

Salt
Judcje,

presiding.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAW (5481)
BROOKE C. WELLS (3421)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt. Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
GRAHAM (1231)
c:JK
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City,, Utah R 4 H 4
Attorney for Appellee

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DAVID C. STREETER,

Case No. 930206-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for aggravated
assault, a 3rd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge,
presiding.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481)
BROOKE C. WELLS (3421)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT

10

POINT

I.
POLICE MISCONDUCT REQUIRES
STREETER'S STATEMENTS BE SUPPRESSED.

A.

THAT

DAVID
10

THE POLICE FAILED TO "SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR"
DAVID
STREETER'S
INVOCATION
OF
HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
TO
COUNSEL
AND
SILENCE

11

THE POLICE FAILED TO CALL DAVID STREETER'S
ATTORNEY
OR
PROVIDE
HIM
ACCESS
TO
A
TELEPHONE

17

C.

THE POLICE THREATENED DAVID STREETER

21

D.

DAVID STREETER'S STATEMENTS MUST BE SUPPRESSED
AS THE DIRECT PRODUCT OF THE TAINT OF PRIOR
POLICE ILLEGALITY

23

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DAVID
STREETER KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY
WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL. . . . .

29

B.

A.
B.

C.

CONCLUSION

THE POLICE
STREETER

FAILED

TO

RE-MIRANDIZE

DAVID
30

POLICE MISCONDUCT NEGATED ANY UNDERSTANDING
DAVID STREETER MAY HAVE HAD CONCERNING HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

32

UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DAVID
STREETER DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND
VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. . . .

33
35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
page
Anderson v. Smith. 751 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1984)

16

Clewis v. Texas. 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338,
18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967)

26

Collazo v. Estelle. 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991)

24-26

Commonwealth v. Coplin, 612 N.E.2d 1188
(Mass. App. 1993)

31, 32

Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 A.2d 920 (Pa),
cert, denied. 493 U.S. 873, 110 S.Ct. 203,
107 L.Ed.2d 156 (1989)

12, 20

Daniel v. State. 644 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1982)
Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880,
68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)

16
13, 14, 27,
29, 33

Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758,
12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964)

35

Fare v. Michael C.. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560,
61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)

14

Haimoel v. State. 706 P. 2d 1173 (Alaska App. 1985)

16

Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019,
82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)

33

Martin v. State. 557 So.2d 622 (Fla. App. 1990)

16

Mathis v. United States. 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503,
20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968)

11

Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)

Oregon v. Bradshaw. 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830,
77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983)
People v. Gaddv. 135 A.D.2d 1082,
523 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
ii

3, 4, 10,
11, 13,
17-21,
23-34
14, 29, 30
17

People v. Locke, 152 Cal.App.3d 1130,
200 Cal.Rptr 20 (Cal. App. 1984)
People v. Smith,

18, 19

466 N.E.2d 236 (111.), reversed,

469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984)
People v. Spivev, 568 N.E.2d 327 (111. App. 1991) . .

14
20, 28, 29

People v. St. Pierre. 522 N.E.2d 61 (111. 1988)

12

Singleton v. State. 344 So.2d 911 (Fla. App. 1977)

20

Smith v. Illinois. 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490,
83 L.Ed. 2d 488 (1984)
Solem v. Stumes. 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338,

13, 14

79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984)

14

State v. Brown. 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (1992)
State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988) . . .

3
12, 15, 17

State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985)

18, 29

State v. Nelson. 748 P.2d 365 (Haw. 1987)

30, 31

State v. Newton. 682 P.2d 295 (Utah 1984)

30

State v. Robinson. 427 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1988)
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991),
and cert, denied,
U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 1282,
117 L.Ed. 2d 507 (1992)

34

3, 13,
16, 17

State v. Santiago. 492 P.2d 657 (Haw. 1971)

30

State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988)
Thompson v. Wainwright. 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979)

5,9
. . . .

16

United States v. Chapdelaine, 616 F.Supp. 522
(D. R.I. 1985)

27, 28

United States v. Guido. 704 F.2d 675 (2nd Cir. 1983)
White v. State. 674 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983)

iii

. . . .

20
17

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. V

1, 11, 18,
25, 30

U.S. Const, amend. VI

2

U.S. Const, amend. XIV

25

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1990)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1992)
Utah Const, art. I, § 7

1
2

Utah Const, art. I, § 1 2

2, 31

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Comment, Equivocal Requests for Counsel:
A Balance of Competing Policy Considerations,
55 Cine.L.Rev. 767, 782 (1987)

16

Note, Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous Request
for Counsel, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 460 (1987)

16

iv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

DAVID C. STREETER,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Case No. 930206-CA
Priority No. 2
:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Emphasis added.

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
eniov the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Emphas is added.
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Emphasis added.

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether

police

misconduct

requires

that

David

Streeter's statements be suppressed?

Standard

of

review

- CORRECTION

OF

ERROR.

Factual

findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress evidence are reviewed using a clearly erroneous
standard.

The court's conclusions of law based on those facts are

reviewed using a correctness standard.
Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (1992).

State v. Brown, 201 Utah

The facts here are undisputed; the court's

legal conclusions are reviewed

for correctness.

"[T]he trial

court's ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of defendant's
Miranda

rights, which

conclusions were based upon

essentially

undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of [an officer's]
colloquy with defendant, present questions of law reviewable under
a correction-of-error standard."

State v. Sampson, 808 P. 2d 1100,

1103 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and
cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992).

"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained
counsel."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602,

, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966).

"[A]ny evidence that the accused

was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course,

3

show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege."
Id. at 476, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725.

2.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that David

Streeter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right
to counsel?

Standard of review - CORRECTION OF ERROR.

See standard

of review for issue number one.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
David Streeter was arrested in the early morning hours of
September 22, 1990 as a result of certain alleged assaults that had
occurred that morning.

R. 228.

He was interrogated by Detective

Cowley, but invoked his right to counsel immediately upon being
Mirandized. After some threatening statements by Detective Cowley,
and

three

additional

invocations of

the right

silence by David, the interrogation was terminated.

to counsel

and

See transcript

of interrogations, pp. 1-2, Exhibit 1 at the motion to suppress
hearing (hereafter "Transcript").1
The police took no action whatsoever with respect to
David's request that his mother be telephoned to obtain counsel, or
to obtain other counsel.

R. 197:11-14, 201:25-202:8, 204:16-25.

X

A copy is attached as Addendum A. Although the transcript
does not make it clear, the first two pages constitute the first
interrogation. Page three begins the second interrogation, some
two hours later. See R. 191-2.
4

Approximately

two

hours

later, Detective

informed that David wanted to speak with him.
was not re-Mirandized.

Cowley

R. 213, 215.

was

David

However, he did indicate that he desired to

speak without counsel at that time.

See Transcript, p. 3.

David

subsequently made incriminating statements. See Transcript, pp. 310.
David Streeter was initially charged with
assault

(Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103

aggravated

(1990), 3rd degree

felony),

conspiracy (Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1990) , class A misdemeanor) ,
and assault (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990), class B misdemeanor) .

R. 8-10.

An amended information charged him with three

counts of attempted homicide (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-52 03 (1990), 2nd degree felony), and one count of aggravated assault.
Mr. Streeter filed a motion to suppress his statements.
R. 67-68, as amended, R. 71-2. This motion was heard on September
23 and 25, 1991.
257.

See transcript of suppression hearing, R. 181-

The motion to suppress was denied.

R. Ill (minute entry), R.

112-116 (memorandum decision).
Pursuant

to

a plea

agreement, David

pled

guilty

to

aggravated assault, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah

5

App. 1988) .

Counts II and III were dismissed.2

See R.

161-7

(statement of defendant), R. 170 (minute entry).
Judge Jay E. Banks3 ordered a ninety day evaluation prior
to sentencing.

R. 171-2.

David was sentenced to a prison term of

0 to 5 years, and ordered to pay restitution.

R. 175.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
David Streeter4 was arrested in the early morning hours
(5:15 A.M.) of Saturday, September 22, 1990.

R. 18.

At approxi-

mately 8:30-9:00 A.M., David was interrogated by Detective Cowley.
R. 189-190. After being Mirandized, David immediately invoked his
rights to silence and/or counsel:

2

The parties appear to have been referring to the original
information, rather than the amended information. This technical
error is without import. The reference to aggravated assault as a
lesser included offense shows the plea was contemplated with
reference to the amended information, and the parties clearly
intended a plea to aggravated assault committed against Craig
Mortensen, with the other (severed) charges dismissed.
3

Sitting by designation.

R. 169.

4

David, d.o.b. 9/14/72 (R. 6, 7, 8, etc.), was arrested less
than 8 days after his eighteenth birthday.
The record further
discloses:
Mr. Streeter looks brighter than he is. He received a
Beta II score [IQ] of 91, which places him in the lower
part of the average range of intelligence. His school
achievement scores are even worse. He reads at a fifth
grade level, spells at the seventh grade level, and does
arithmetic at the seventh grade level. He dropped out of
high school in the eleventh grade . . .
Psychological Evaluation, p. 1, attached to Diagnostic Evaluation
Report (in court file in sealed envelope).
This information
obviously has direct bearing on David's ability to understand his
rights, and make a knowing waiver of them.
6

TC5: Having these rights in mind do you wish
speak with us now without an attorney present?
DS 6 :

to

No.

Transcript, p. 1.

The interrogation was not terminated.

Rather,

Detective Cowley continued, attempted to cajole David into making
a statement, and threatened him:
TC:

You don't want to talk to us?

DS:

I don't know why I am really even in here. All I
was doing was sleeping over at my friends lawn last
night and the cops just come ripping in the yard
and arrested us and

TC:

Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to
ask you, would you be willing to answer those
questions without a lawyer present [?]

DS:

Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really
don't know why I am here.

TC:

So does that mean we can ask you questions and you
will answer the ones you want to answer?

DS:

Yes[,] I have the right to stop at any time though.

TC:

Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that
attitude with us.

DS:

Well I ain't trying to

TC:

Because we have all the witnesses we need and we
know who has done what and who has done what to
who. So I want the truth out of you and I want it
now. Now do you understand that?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Who were you with tonight [?]

[.]

Transcript, p. 1.

David responded by reinvoking his right to

counsel:
5

Detective Cowley.

6

David Streeter.
7

Id.

DS:

Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here, all you
have to do is call my mom and he will be down here.

TC:

You want your attorney?

DS:

Yes.

DS:

And you don't want to talk to us?

DS:

Yes.

TC:

O.K.

Only at this point, after four invocations of his constitu-

tional

rights,

was

the

interrogation

returned to a holding cell.

terminated.

David

was

R. 211-2.

Detective Cowley made no attempt to comply with David's
request

that his mother be telephoned

197:11-14.

to obtain counsel.

R.

Detective Cowley did nothing to attempt to locate an

attorney for David, and did nothing to attempt to have someone else
obtain an attorney for him.

R. 201:25-202:8, 204:16-25.

Two hours later, David broke down and informed Officer
Robert Dey that he wanted to speak with Det. Cowley.

Officer Dey

took David to an interrogation room for this purpose.

R. 230, 234.

Detective Cowley did not re-Mirandize David.
206:7, 217:14-23.

R. 205:23-

The second interrogation proceeded:

TC:

Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of
your rights?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And after being advised of your rights you said
that you wanted to talk to a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Now it is your desire and you come forth voluntarily that you want to talk to me now?

[.]

[.]

DS:

Yes [.]

TC:

And you want to talk to me without a lawyer?

DS:

Yes [.]

TC:

Go ahead.

Transcript, p. 3. David thereafter made incriminating statements.
See Transcript, pp. 3-10.
Pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) ,
David pled guilty to aggravated assault and now appeals the denial
of his motion to suppress.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Detective

Cowley

illegally

Streeter's invocation of rights.

failed

to

honor

David

David indicated in unequivocal

terms that he would not submit to interrogation without the
presence of an attorney.

This invocation was not scrupulously

honored. Detective Cowley continued to interrogate, and attempted
to cajole David into retreating from his position and into waiving
his

rights.

David

was

threatened.

Interrogation

was not

terminated until after David had invoked his rights for the fourth
time.

Finally, the police did nothing to comply with David's

request that his mother be called to obtain his attorney.

David

was not given access to a telephone, and no call was made on his
behalf.

David's

subsequent

"initiation"

of

subsequent

interrogation and purported "waiver" of his rights were the direct
product of the prior taint of this police illegality.
statements must be suppressed.
9

David's

The

totality

of

the

circumstances

do

not

support

a

conclusion that David knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his rights at the second interrogation.
Mirandized.

His understanding

of

his

David was not re-

rights was

irreparably

colored and tainted by Detective Cowley's failure to respect his
rights.

The State has failed to show that, subsequent to the

police misconduct, David understood his rights correctly, or that
he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights.
David's statements must be suppressed.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I.
POLICE MISCONDUCT REQUIRES
DAVID
STREETER'S
STATEMENTS
SUPPRESSED.

THAT
BE

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the United States Supreme Court set forth a
simple mandate for the protection of an accused's constitutional
rights:
[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in[-]custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full
opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination, the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of
those rights must be fully honored.
Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at

, 16 L.Ed.2d at 719.

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that
he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise
10

his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after
the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the
right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free
choice in producing a statement after the privilege has
been once invoked.
If the individual states that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present. At that time, the individual must
have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to
have him present during any subsequent questioning. If
the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates
that he wants one before speaking to police, they must
respect his decision to remain silent.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S. Ct. at

, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 719

(emphasis added, footnote omitted).
While in custody, the protections of Miranda attach to
any interrogation on any subject.
U.S. 1, 4-5, 88 S.Ct. 1503,

Mathis v. United States, 391

, 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 385 (1968).

can be no dispute that David Streeter was in custody.

There

The record

is undisputed that prior to and in between interrogations, David
Streeter was detained in a holding cell.

R. 228-30.

See also R.

18 (indicating David was arrested at 5:15 A.M., over three hours
prior to his interrogation).

A.

THE POLICE FAILED TO "SCRUPULOUSLY
HONOR"7 DAVID STREETER'S INVOCATION
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
COUNSEL AND SILENCE.

The police in this case failed to follow Miranda's simple
mandate.

When asked, "Having these rights in mind do you wish to

speak with us now without an attorney present?", David responded

7

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966).
11

with an emphatic

"No."

This clear, unequivocal

invocation of

constitutional rights was ignored by the police.
The police are entitled to clarification of an equivocal
request for counsel.

State v. Griffin, 754 P. 2d 965, 969 (Utah

App. 1988) . David Streeter's response of "No." when asked "do you
wish to speak with us now without an attorney present" was not in
the least bit equivocal.

Compare People v. St. Pierre, 522 N.E.2d

61, 66-8 (111. 1988) ("Q.

Do you wish one [an attorney] ? A. Yes."

held unequivocal invocation, follow-up "clarification" could not
render invocation ambiguous); see also Commonwealth v. Zook, 553
A.2d 920

(Pa), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 873, 110 S. Ct. 203, 107

L.Ed.2d 156 (1989), discussed infra at 12, 20.

At most, there is

a question whether David is invoking the right to counsel, the
right to silence, or both. Regardless of which situation pertains,
the

police

were

obligated

to

immediately

terminate

the

interrogation.
At

the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective

Cowley tried to show that in fact the continuation of the interrogation was merely clarification:
A.
[by Det. Cowley] I said, "Having these rights
in mind, do you wish to speak to us now without having an
attorney present?"
Q.

And what was Mr. Streeter's response?

A.

He said, "No."

Q.

That answer was unequivocal, wasn't it?

A.

That's right,

Q.

It required no clarification, did it?
12

A,

Well, in my mind it did.

Q.
All right.
Well, what words did he say,
detective Cowley, after the word no that indicated to you
that that was not [un]equivocal? What words?
A.

Right after no?

He didn't say anything.

Q.
All right. So he indicated to you that he does
not wish to go forward without an attorney being present,
correct?
A.

He said, "No."

Q.
And he said nothing further; we have got that
clear, right?
A.

That's right.

Q.
All right. And vet vou continued with this
interrogation, did you not?
A.
I wanted to clarify and that's why I asked him
the next question,
R. 195:2-25 (emphasis added).
No means no.

The only point that could possibly be

clarified was whether David had invoked the right to silence, the
right to counsel, or both.

In any instance, the police were

required to terminate the interrogation.
The Transcript does not reveal David's initial invocation
to be equivocal.
"Under Miranda

Subsequent responses do not alter this result.

and Edwards, however, an accused's

postrequest

responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast doubt on
the

clarity

of

his

initial

request

for

Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92, 105 S.Ct. 490,

counsel."

Smith

v.

, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 491

(1984) (per curiam); accord Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1111 ("The fact
that defendant continued to answer questions was not a sufficient
indication that he was abandoning his right to counsel.").
13

Edwards set forth a "bright-line rule" that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel. Solem
v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d
579 (1984) .
In the absence of such a bright-line
prohibition, the authorities through "badger[ing]" or
"overreaching"--explicit
or
subtle,
deliberate
or
unintentional--might otherwise wear down the accused and
persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his
earlier request for counsel's assistance.
Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d
405 (1983); Fare v. Michael C.. 442 U.S. [707,] 719, 99
S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 [(1979)] . With respect to the
waiver inquiry, we accordingly have emphasized that a
valid waiver "cannot be established by showing only that
[the accused] responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
[477,] 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 [(1981)].
Using an accused's subsequent responses to cast doubt on
the adequacy of the initial request itself
is even more
intolerable.
"No authority, and no logic, permits the
interrogator to proceed . . . on his own terms and as if
the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that the
defendant might be induced to say something casting
retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he
wished to speak through an attorney or not at all."
fPeople v. Smith,] 102 111.2d [365,] 376, 466 N.E.2d
[236,] 241 [(1984)] (Simon, J., dissenting).
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 98-100, 105 S.Ct. at

, 83 L.Ed.2d

at 495-6 (footnote omitted).
Detective Cowley wasn't trying to clarify; rather, he was
attempting to get David to recant his unequivocal invocation of
constitutional rights:
TC:

You don't want to talk to us?

DS:

I don't really know why I am even in here. All I
was doing was sleeping over at my friends lawn last
night and the cops just come ripping in the yard
and arrested us and

14

TC:

Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to
ask you, would you be willing to answer those
questions without a lawyer present [?] [8]

DS:

Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really
don't know why I am here.

TC:

So does that mean we can ask you questions and you
will answer the ones you want to answer?

DS:

Yes[,] I have the right to stop at any time though.

TC:

Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that
attitude with us.

DS:

Well I ain't trying to

TC:

Because we have all the witnesses we need and we
know who has done what and who has done what to
who. So I want the truth out of you and I want it
now. Now do you understand that?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Who were you with tonight [?] [93

[.]

Transcript, p. 1.
This

further

questioning

directed at clarification.

by

the

detective

was

not

Instead, he threatened David, and did

his utmost to convince and persuade him to give a statement despite

8

This question doesn't even address the possible ambiguity of
whether David was invoking his right to counsel, silence, or both.
The only possible responses to this question are a repeat of the
prior invocation of rights (resulting in no clarification), or a
retreat from Mr. Streeter's prior position (again, providing no
clarification).
Detective Cowley wasn't seeking clarification;
instead he was seeking a retreat from David's prior invocation of
rights.
9

This question is substantive interrogation. Leaving aside
the issue of police persuasion, as of this point the police must
assert that all necessary clarification has occurred. See Griffin,
754 P.2d at 969 ("If, however, the accused, absent police persuasion, indicates he does not want counsel present at that time, the
interrogation may continue."). However, as of this point in time
no clarification had occurred.
15

his

invocation

of rights.

This colloquy

only

clarified

that

Detective Cowley was not going to respect David's invocation, and
wanted a statement right then and there.
Giving the State the benefit of the doubt and assuming
arguendo

that David's request was equivocal, conduct of this type

has been roundly condemned by this Court:
The main problem inherent in the clarification
approach is "the additional opportunity given to law
enforcement officials to . . . [use] clarifying questions to dissuade" suspects from asserting their right to
counsel.
[Note, Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous
Request for Counsel, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 460 (1987)] at
472. See Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n.9 (2nd
Cir. 1984); Daniel v. State. 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo.
1982) (permissible for officer to "seek clarification of
the suspect's desires, as long as he does not disguise
the clarification as a subterfuge for coercion or
intimidation") . See also Thompson v. Wainwricrht, 601
F.2d 768, 771-2 (5th Cir. 1979) (during purported effort
to clarify, officer asserted that obtaining counsel may
not be in defendant's best interest); Hampel v. State.
706 P. 2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska App. 1985) (during purported
effort to clarify, officer emphasized delay and complexity of obtaining an attorney).
One commentator has suggested that only one
question should be permitted to seek clarification. With
our embellishment in the form of an introductory statement, that question is as follows: You have been advised
of your rights, including the right to have an attorney
with you during this interview even if you cannot afford
to hire one.
What you just said leads me to wonder
whether or not you wish to avail yourself of that right.
"Do you want the assistance of [an attorney] at this time
or do you agree to answer questions without the presence
of [an attorney]?"
Comment, Equivocal Requests for
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Considerations,
55 Cine.L.Rev. 767, 782 (1987).
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1111 n.18 (Utah App. 1990), cert.
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) , and cert, denied,
S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992).

U.S.

, 112

See also Martin v. State, 557

So.2d 622, 625 (Fla. App. 1990) ("At the very least the Detective
16

was required to take a neutral stance on whether [defendant] needed
counsel.

Any other conclusion would vitiate the protections which

are to be supplied by Miranda.") ; People v. Gaddy, 135 A.D.2d 1082,
523 N.Y.S.2d

301, 302

(N.Y. App. Div. 1987)

(improper to tell

defendant that stepchild would be placed in a shelter if he wanted
an attorney); White v. State, 674 P.2d 31, 36 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983)

(improper to attempt to dissuade prisoner from exercising

right to counsel by threatening the death penalty and saying no
attorney would be needed if defendant were not guilty).
The police conduct here runs afoul of Griffin, Sampson,
and Miranda.

David Streeter's invocation of his constitutional

rights was not "scrupulously honored."

The interrogation should

have ceased immediately when David evidenced his refusal to proceed
without an attorney.

Instead, David had to invoke his rights four

times before Detective Cowley reluctantly complied.

B.

THE POLICE FAILED TO CALL DAVID
STREETER'S ATTORNEY OR PROVIDE HIM
ACCESS TO A TELEPHONE.

In response to improper continued interrogation after
invoking his constitutional rights, David said "I want my lawyer
here, all you have to do is call my mom and he will be down here."
Transcript, p. 2.
Detective

Cowley

The police completely ignored this request.
did

Streeter's attorney.

not

call

David's

mother

R. 202:6-8,10 204:23-25.X1

10

to

obtain

Mr.

Detective Cowley

Q.
Did you call his mother as he had suggested you do
so that she might contact an attorney?
A.
I did not.
17

did not have anyone else attempt to get David an attorney.
204:20-22.12

R.

Police action or inaction that prevents a defendant

from obtaining counsel in a timely fashion violates a defendant's
right to counsel.

State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). 13

California has found the right to use of a telephone to
be of constitutional dimension.

In People v. Locke, 152 Cal.App.3d

1130, 200 Cal.Rptr 20 (Cal. App. 1984), defendant was detained in
connection with

an attempted

homicide.

After being

rights, she invoked her right to counsel.

read

her

She remained in the

officer's presence for the next three hours. The officer respected
her invocation of rights, but did nothing to obtain an attorney or
provide access to a phone.

After three hours, she was transferred

to the custody of another officer.

Defendant was re-Mirandized,

and again invoked her right to counsel.

Again, nothing was done

concerning her request for counsel, but her rights were otherwise
respected.

After a time defendant began to sob, and the officer

11

Q.
Did you call either of Mr. Streeter's parents as Mr.
Streeter indicated he wanted you to do?
A.
No, I did not.
12

Q.
What did you do to attempt to have anyone else
obtain an attorney for him?
A.
I didn't do anything.
13

Miranda recognizes that "If authorities conclude that they
will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in
which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain
from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment
privilege so long as they do not question him during that time."
Id. , 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at
, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. The State
has presented no evidence here that any continuing investigation
was underway; rather it appears that counsel was denied solely in
hopes that David might break down and make incriminating
statements.
18

attempted

to

console

her.

Defendant

statements, which were admitted at trial.

then made

incriminating

The jury conviction was

reversed:
A Miranda explanation of one's rights must be
meaningfully implemented, in order that the constitutional purpose be served. We are of the opinion, under the
facts and circumstances of a case such as this, that a
minimal requirement is that the arrested suspect be told
of his or her right, and be given an opportunity, to use
a telephone for the purpose of securing the desired
attorney.
Such telephone calls should be allowed
immediately upon request, or as soon thereafter as
practicable.
Anything less would make of Miranda a
hollow ineffectual pretense.
We accordingly find prejudicial error of
constitutional dimension.
Locke, 152 Cal. App.3d at 1133, 200 Cal.Rptr at 22 (cites omitted).
One court has commented on the inappropriateness of a
delay

of

even

so much

as one hour

in providing

access

telephone:
Legitimate security concerns may have prompted the
arresting agents to deny [defendant] Guido's initial
request to call his attorney while still at the apartment
where he was arrested. But we see no valid reasons apart
from administrative convenience to prevent a suspect from
calling his attorney once he is brought to a courthouse
for processing. In our view, the accused's interest in
obtaining the prompt assistance of counsel outweighs any
such administrative concerns. In this case, we see no
substantial evidence in the record to suggest that the
officers delayed Guido's access to an attorney in the
hope that he might incriminate himself. Moreover, Guido
was allowed to call his attorney within approximately one
to one-and-a-half hours of his arrest.
Under these
circumstances, we cannot say the delay was egregious.
Nonetheless, we think the better procedure would have
been to permit Guido to call his attorney on Guido's
arrival at the [ ] courthouse, and we expect that such
requests will be so honored in the future.

19

to a

United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 678 (2nd Cir. 1983).

Here,

it appears that the police may have delayed telephonic

access

precisely in hopes that David might incriminate himself.
Requests to call attorneys should be granted without
delay:
We do not view Lt. Landis' continued
questioning as
intended to clarify Appellant's desires respecting
counsel. What, in Appellant's request, needs clarification?
What was equivocal or ambiguous?
Appellant
reportedly said, "Can I use the phone to call my mother
to see if she can get me an attorney?" to paraphrase Lt.
Landis' testimony. The only acceptable response from the
police should have been "YES"! Not, "are you saying you
want us to stop questioning you until you have an
attorney present?"
Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 A.2d 920, 923 (Pa.), cert, denied, 493
U.S. 873, 110 S.Ct. 203, 107 L.Ed.2d 156 (1989).

David Streeter's

request deserved equal dignity, and immediate access to a phone.
See also Singleton v. State, 344 So.2d 911, 912-3 (Fla. App. 1977)
(defendant should have been given opportunity to phone when she
stated,

"Maybe I had better ask my mother if I should get

[an

attorney].")
See also People v. Spivev, 568 N.E.2d 327

(111. App.

1991), discussed infra at 28, dealing with "incommunicado

interro-

gation" as a Miranda violation.
David Streeter was improperly denied an opportunity to
use a telephone to obtain an attorney.

20

C.

THE
POLICE
STREETER.

THREATENED

DAVID

After David Streeter had invoked his right to counsel and
silence,

Detective

Cowley's

"clarification"

resulted

in

the

following exchange:
TC:

So does that mean we can ask you questions and you
will answer the ones you want to answer?

DS:

Yes[,] I have the right to stop at any time though.

TC:

Well, I'll tell vou right now that if vou take that
attitude with us.

DS:

Well I ain't trying to

TC:

Because we have all the witnesses we need and we
know who has done what and who has done what to
who. So I want the truth out of vou and I want it
now. Now do vou understand that?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Who were you with tonight [?]

[.]

Transcript at p. 2 (emphasis added).

Miranda clearly requires that

an accused be permitted to terminate an interrogation at any time.
"If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."
at 719.

Id. , 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at

When David

, 16 L.Ed.2d

sought assurance that he could

terminate

interrogation at any time, the police instead threatened him and
indicated

that

consequences.

such

conduct

would

have

some unspecified

dire

As of this point in the interrogation, Detective

Cowley's "clarification" has just confirmed that David Streeter
does NOT have the right to terminate questioning without further
sanction.

This

conduct

is illegal
21

and inexcusable.

Miranda

requires that the accused be accurately informed of their rights.
The police cannot thereafter indicate that these rights do not
exist without tainting the initial warnings.
At the hearing on David's motion to suppress, Detective
Cowley understandably denied that his statements were threatening:
Q.
All right.
Detective Cowley, your next
question to him, as indicated in this transcript is,
"I'll tell you right now if you take that attitude with
us" and then you stop, isn't that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.
All right. In other words you were telling him
that if he indicated an attitude that he would only
answer some of the questions or none of the questions you
apparently were going to do something. What was it?
A.

I can't recall.

Q.
But your words were-- would you consider these
words a threat, "I tell you right now if you take that
attitude with us"?
A.

In my opinion, no, that's not a threat.

Q.

Then what is the explanation of that term?

MS. BYRNE: The question is asked and answered,
your honor. I don't think there's any point in continuing to badger this witness.
MS. WELLS:
your honor.
THE COURT:

I don't think this is badgering,
The objection is overruled.

Q.
(BY MS. WELLS)
If it was not a threat,
Detective Cowley, what is the-- what was the meaning of
your question to him, "I'll tell you right now, if you
take that attitude with us"?
A.
Apparently I wanted to clarify and tell him
that if he wanted to answer certain questions and not
answer others that we were interested in finding answers

22

to and the way he was acting at that time, apparently
that's why I said it. C14]

Q.
So your previous response that you asked him or
told him that you-- if he took a certain type of attitude
with you was said in order to clarify his response isn't
followed up with any clarifying questions is it, Detective?
A.

No.

Q.
In fact what it's followed up with is another
type of threat, isn't it? "We have all the witnesses we
need and we know who has done what to who." Isn't that
right?
A.

That's a statement of fact. It's not a threat.

R. 198:14-199:19, 200:17-201:3.

Statement of fact or otherwise,

these statements are clearly threatening in nature.
accurately

indicate, as Miranda

requires, that

They do not

David

has

the

absolute right to terminate the interrogation at any time for any
reason without fear of reprisal or other adverse consequence.
a

result

of

these

threats, David

Streeter's

rights

were

As
not

scrupulously honored.

D.

DAVID STREETER'S STATEMENTS MUST BE
SUPPRESSED AS THE DIRECT PRODUCT OF
THE
TAINT
OF
PRIOR
POLICE
ILLEGALITY.

As a result of the police misconduct in failing to honor
David Streeter's rights, failing to phone or provide access to a
phone, and threatening David, his statements must be suppressed.

14

An interesting response. The words are all there, but they
don't say anything.
The reason is clear: this statement was a
threat, but Detective Cowley is unwilling to admit it.
23

Collazo v. Estelle. 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) is on all fours with this case. The Ninth Circuit introduces
the case as follows:
Appellant Collazo was arrested for murder and
advised of his Miranda rights. He declined to waive
them, asking instead to talk to a lawyer. The police
responded to his request by telling Collazo it "might be
worse" for him if he talked to an attorney, and that it
was in his best interest to talk to them without one.
Three hours later, [153 he "changed his mind," was
readvised of his rights, [16] and talked to the police.
What he told them was used to convict him and send him to
prison. . . . We conclude that Collazo's confession was
involuntary, and that its use to convict him violated his
Constitutional rights.
Id. at 413.

After Mr. Collazo requested counsel, the colloquy

between Mr. Collazo and Officer Destro continued:
Collazo: Oh, you know, ah, can I, you know,
talk to a lawyer?
Destro: It's up to you.
chance to talk to us, though.
Collazo:

This is your last

I understand that.

Destro: Once you get a lawyer, he's gonna say
forget it. You know, don't talk to the police.
Then it might be worse for you.
Collazo:
Destro:
Collazo:

Pardon me?
Then it might be worse for you.
Why?

Destro: Because, ah, you know, there's other
people involved in this thing, and we would like to
15

Unlike the present case, Collazo was given access to a phone
and talked to his wife.
The incommunicado
nature of David's
detention makes reversal more compelling here.
16

Unlike this case, where David was not readvised of his
complete rights. This distinction only makes reversal in this case
more compelling.
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get everybody.
uh--

If you don't want to talk about it,

Rolen: Well, he's asked for a lawyer, so why
don't we, I guess we'll end our interview right
there.
Collazo: If, ah, if ah, this gonna be stupid
for you, you know, for me it means a lot, you know.
Destro:
If you're arrested for murder, it
does mean a lot.
The police then departed, leaving Collazo in the
interview room to ponder Officer Destro's inappropriate
admonition and to consider whether he could afford to
exercise his Constitutional rights.
Id. at 414.

The Ninth Circuit, en banc, analyzes this police

conduct in detail, Id. at 416-419, and concludes:
Based on the foregoing, our plenary review of
the tactics used by Officer Destro in an attempt to
pressure Collazo into talking to his adversaries leads us
to a two-part conclusion.
First, Officer Destro's
tactics add up to a flagrant breach of the prophylactic
rules established by the Supreme Court in Miranda and its
progeny to protect a defendant's Constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Second, Officer Destro's
overreaching behavior violated not only Miranda, but also
the general Constitutional prohibition against coercive
interrogation practices likely to result in involuntary
responses. Officer Destro's gambit was inconsistent with
Collazo's
Fifth
Amendment
right
against
selfincrimination as well as his right to consult an
attorney. His inquisitorial stratagem was calculated to
break Collazo's will. As such, it offends due process as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Collazo, 940 F.2d at 419-20.
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Having found initial illegality,17 the court went on to
determine that Collazo's decision to initiate further contact with
the detectives was the product of this initial taint:
It is readily apparent from the historical
facts that Collazo's "change of mind"--including his
alleged Miranda waiver--was the direct product of the
primary illegality in this case.
Officer Destro's
strategy was successful.
Collazo caved in. There is
nothing of substance to demonstrate otherwise. There was
"no break in the stream of events . . . sufficient to
insulate the statement from the effect of all that went
before."
Clewis [v. Texasl , 386 U.S. [707,] 710, 87
S.Ct. [1338,] 1340[, 18 L.Ed.2d 423, 427 (1967)]. Under
the circumstances, Officer Rolen's readvice of rights and
Collazo's alleged waiver thereof was an empty ceremony.
Collazo, 940 F.2d at 422-3.
The present case is, if anything, more egregious than
Collazo.

David was of a tender age, with only a fifth grade

reading level. Like Collazo, David was threatened.
of the right to counsel was ignored.

His invocation

Unlike Collazo, David was not

re-Mirandized in full, and was not provided access to a telephone.
Finally, David caved in after only two hours, rather than three in
Collazo.

The taint from the police misconduct is therefore even

less attenuated here than in Collazo. At the second interrogation,
the incomplete "readvice of rights and
thereof [were] an empty ceremony."

[David]'s alleged waiver

For precisely the reasons given

in Collazo, David's statements must be suppressed here.

17

As was found in this case (R. 237:1-7):
MS. WELLS:
. . . It's our position, Your
Honor, that during the initial interview conducted by
Detective Cowley, that upon-- when the defendant
indicated No, the very first time, that the interview
should have stopped at that point.
THE COURT: There's no question about that.
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United States v. Chapdelaine, 616 F.Supp. 522 (D. R.I.
1985) is also illustrative.
trafficking.
police

Id. at 523.

station,

summoned,

but

whereupon

was

not

Chapdelaine was arrested for drug
He was advised of his rights at the
he

requested

permitted

any

that

access

his
to

attorney
a

be

telephone.

Chapdelaine was then asked for consent to search his vehicle, but
he declined.

Chapdelaine was subsequently questioned.

Id. at 529-

30.
As evidence that Chapdelaine had waived his right to an
attorney,

the

State presented

contact with an officer.

evidence

that

he had

initiated

The court noted:

The government has stressed, with considerable
fanfare, the fact that the defendant had been given his
Miranda warnings by [an officer] early on, and thus knew
that he had a right not to talk with [officer] McCarthy.
But, Miranda requires not only that a defendant be
informed
of his rights, but that the police behave in a
manner consistent with those rights. Thus, a defendant
who is abstractly aware of his Miranda rights (and with
the popularity of police shows on television, there are
few persons who are not familiar with the litany) must
also be assured that they will be respected in his
situation.
. . . Even if, as the government would have
it, McCarthy's interrogation came about in consequence of
Chapdelaine's invitation, the prosecution has not
convincingly refuted Chapdelaine's claim that he requested an attorney, nor has it offered any substantial
evidence whatsoever to indicate that, as Edwards demands
in such circumstances, he knowingly and intelligently
abandoned his right to counsel and his right to silence.
The court must also note that the
circumstances of this case do not readily suggest a
waiver.
This defendant was arrested at gunpoint and
taken to the police station. There, he was confronted by
a veritable array of officers from several different law
enforcement agencies, accompanied by the United States
Attorney. Despite his requests to be allowed to call his
attorney, he was not permitted to do so until his
arraignment the following day. Under the circumstances,
27

any withdrawal of the defendant's original insistence
that his attorney be present should not be lightly
inferred.
Chapdelaine. 616 F.Supp. at 530-1.
The situation here is similar. David Streeter was asleep
in a friend's yard when "the cops just come ripping in the yard and
arrested us . . . " Transcript p. 1.

David was interrogated in the

presence of Detective Cowley, Officer Allen Call, Deputy Sterner,
and possibly Officer Bob Dey.

R. 206:8-10.

David asked that his

mother be called to obtain counsel, but no call was made and he was
not provided
constitutional

access to a phone.
rights

were

Finally, his

ignored

by

the

invocations of

police.

As

in

Chapdelaine, David Streeter's statements must be suppressed.
People v. Spivey. 568 N.E.2d 327 (111. App. 1991) also
has marked similarities to this case.
questioned

in a hospital

Spivey, a 17 year old, was

in the presence of his parents, and

invoked his right to silence and to an attorney.

He was later

arrested, and was not permitted to speak with his parents or an
attorney.18

Spivey was Mirandized, "waived" his rights, and made

incriminating statements.

The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed:

[D]efendant's pre-arrest invocation of his fifth amendment rights to remain silent and to have an attorney
present was ignored immediately following his arrest, and
that notwithstanding the Miranda warnings, the police
created a coercive environment to obtain the statements
by subjecting defendant to incommunicado incarceration.
Such police action and conduct caused defendant's
statements to be taken in violation of his constitutional
rights.

18

The police went so far as to deny that Spivey was present at
the police station. See 566 N.E.2d at 329, 333.
28

Id. at 334.
More

specifically,

the

court

found

"that

court's conclusion is proper that the police created the
cado

the

trial

incommuni-

environment because they knew defendant would not submit to

interrogation while in the presence of his mother and stepfather,
which was a clear violation of Miranda."
original).

Id. at 333 (emphasis in

The police here had identical concerns that David

Streeter would not submit to interrogation after consultation with
an attorney.
broke

down

They therefore held David incommunicado
and

talked.

David

should

have

been

until he
afforded

an

opportunity to use the telephone and consult with his attorney.
Instead,

his will was broken and he was

incriminating statements.

coerced

into making

These statements must be suppressed.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT
DAVID
STREETER
KNOWINGLY,
INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
[A]n accused's statements made after he has invoked his
right to counsel and before counsel is made available to
him are admissible if three conditions are satisfied.
First, it must be the accused, not the law enforcement
officers, who initiates the conversations in which the
incriminating
statements are made.
Second, the
prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
Third, the accused's statements must be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to have been voluntarily
made.
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985) (citing Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405

(1983)

(plurality opinion), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 1101 S.Ct.
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1880,

16 L.Ed.2d 378

(1981), and State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295

(Utah 1984)) .
But even if a conversation taking place after
the accused has "expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel," is initiated by the
accused, where reinterrogation follows, the burden
remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent
events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to
have counsel present during the interrogation.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. at

A.

, 77 L.Ed.2d at 412.

THE POLICE FAILED TO RE-MIRANDIZE
DAVID STREETER.

The record is undisputed that David Streeter was not reMirandized prior to the second interrogation.
217:14-23.

R. 205:23-206:7,

This fact is critical to a complete understanding and

review of the extent to which David Streeter understood his rights.
Re-Mirandizing should be required prior to all subsequent
interrogations.

Hawaii

requires

that

officers

re-Mirandize

defendants at subsequent interrogations despite proper warnings at
prior interrogations.

State v. Nelson, 748 P.2d 365 (Haw. 1987).

In Nelson, defendant was Mirandized and interrogated on Christmas
day concerning certain harassing phone calls.

Two days later,

officers went to defendant's house and interrogated him concerning
other phone calls.
United

States

After noting that "'the protections which the

Supreme

Court

enumerated

in

Miranda

have

an

independent source in the Hawaii Constitution's privilege against
self incrimination.'", Nelson, 748 P.2d at 369 (quoting State v.
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Haw. 1971), the Hawaii Supreme Court
ruled:
30

This was hardly "the same interrogation" conducted on
Christmas Day. The officers had new information regarding different offenses, and it was incumbent upon them to
"Mirandize" the defendant again.
Nelson, 748 P.2d at 372.

Utah should adopt a similar rule under

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Commonwealth v. Coplin, 612 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. App. 1993)
involved the issue of whether Miranda warnings given at the time of
arrest carried over to a subsequent interrogation where incomplete
warnings were given.19

There was no evidence that the earlier

warnings were understood.

The court reversed, holding that the

prior warnings were inadequate to show a knowing and intelligent
waiver at a later time.
In this case, David may have understood his rights when
they were

first read to him.

However, his understanding was

tempered and colored by subsequent conduct of the police.

At the

second interrogation, the only warnings given were as follows:
TC:

Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of
your rights?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And after being advised of your rights you said
that you wanted to talk to a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Now is it your desire and you come forth
voluntarily that you want to talk to me now?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you want to talk to me without a lawyer?

[.]

[.]

[.]

19

The accused was not told that anything he said could be used
against him in a court of law. The incomplete warnings given David
Streeter at the second interrogation share this same flaw.
31

DS:

Yes [.]

TC:

Go ahead.

Transcript p. 3.

In the totality of the circumstances, it is true

that David was advised of his rights, but his invocation of those
rights was not honored.
Detective Cowley.

Additionally, he was threatened by

The State has made no showing that David's

statements were not the product and result of these prior threats.
As in Coplin, the prior Miranda warnings cannot carry over to the
subsequent interrogation.

At minimum, David should have been re-

Mirandized.20

B.

POLICE MISCONDUCT NEGATED ANY UNDERSTANDING DAVID STREETER MAY HAVE HAD
CONCERNING
HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.

At the second interrogation, David Streeter's knowledge
of his rights was limited to his prior receipt of Miranda warnings,
as colored by Detective Cowley's threats and failures to honor
David's rights.
David

invoked

his

right

to

counsel

Transcript p. 1, but his invocation was ignored.

20

and

silence,

After stating

The trial court improperly relied on this incorporation of
the prior Miranda warnings to support his finding that David made
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. See
Memorandum Decision, R. 112-116 at 115 ("The defendant made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In reading
lines 1 through 8 of page 3 of the transcript of the interrogation
it is evident that defendant understood that he had a right to
counsel and that he elected to proceed without benefit of
counsel.").
As explained in POINT I.D., supra at 23, this
purported "waiver" is the direct product of the prior taint
resulting from Detective Cowley's misconduct.
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that he might answer some questions but wanted to reserve the right
to

terminate

the

interrogation,

Transcript

p.

2, the

officer

threatened David rather than confirm and reaffirm his Miranda right
to

terminate

invocations

interrogation.
of

his

right

Only
to

counsel

after
and

three

additional

silence

was

the

interrogation finally terminated.
David was informed of his right to counsel, but the
police did nothing to secure him that right.

David stated "I want

my lawyer here, all you have to do is call my mom and he will be
down here," Transcript p. 2, but he was neither provided access to
a telephone, nor was a call to his mother to secure counsel made on
his behalf by the police.
After being threatened by Detective Cowley, David was
placed in a holding cell, and kept incommunicado.

Barely 18,

living at home, and with a fifth grade reading level, David's will
was overborne. After two hours, he broke down and asked to talk to
the detective.

C.

UNDER
THE
TOTALITY
OF
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, DAVID STREETER DID
NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND
VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL.

Findings of waiver must be based on the particular facts
and

circumstances

of

each

case,

including

experience, and conduct of the accused."
101 S.Ct. at

the

"background,

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482,

, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304

U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).
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That David

may have been particularly susceptible to the threats and coercion
of Detective Cowley does not in any fashion assist the State in
showing that David made a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary

waiver.
The Miranda warnings David received prior to his first
interrogation were vitiated by the subsequent police misconduct.
David was aware of the rote litany, but was further aware that the
police were not going to help him obtain his attorney or release
him until he made a statement.
he

could

threats.

terminate

When he attempted to confirm that

interrogation,

the

police

responded

with

At the conclusion of this travesty, David's knowledge of

his rights was that they existed in a vacuum, in name only, and
would not be honored by the police.
Where an accused accedes to questioning only after it
becomes

apparent

that his request

for counsel

is going to be

denied, to the extent this may even be considered a waiver it
cannot be said to be voluntary.

State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217,

226 (Minn. 1988) . David only asked to speak to the detective after
his

rights

incommunicado
right

were

not

honored,

he

in a holding cell.

was

threatened,

David's will was

overborne, and he acceded to further questioning.
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placed

The police made clear that his

to an attorney would not be honored.

must be suppressed.

and

His statements

CONCLUSION
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an
accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will
become aware of, and exercise, these rights.
If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there
is something very wrong with that system.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S. Ct. 1758,
L.Ed.2d

977,

985-6

(1964)

(footnotes

omitted,

, 12

emphasis

in

original).
The police misconduct in this case, and the continuing
taint of that misconduct

in compelling David Streeter to make

incriminating statements, requires that David Streeter's statements
be suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JJ^L

day of July, 1993.

ROBERT'K. HElNEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Transcript of September 22, 1990 Interrogations

O.K. I'm Detective
what it your name?

Cowley vith

the police

department and

David
David what?
David Streeter
Spell you last name for me.
Streeter
What is your date of birth?
09-14-72
And you address?
3551 South 7200 ffest
Your home phone number?
250-9546
Have you been advised of your rights?
Yes
I'm going to.do it again.
You have the right to remain
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you
in a court of lav. You have the right to talk to a lawyer
and have him
present vith vou while you
are being
questioned. if you cannot arrora a nire a lawyer, one -will
be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you
wish.
You can decide at anytime to exercise these rights
and not answer any questions or make any statements, po you
understand these rights that I have explained to you?
Yes
Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now
without an attorney present?
No
You don't want to talk to us?
I don't know why I am really even in here. All I vas doing
was sleeping over at my friends lavn last night and the cops
just come ripping in the yard and arrested us and
Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you,
would you be willing to answer those questions without a

Page 2
Interview vith David Streeter
lawyer present.
DS:

Maybe some of them.
knov vhy I am here.

It

just depends cause I

really don't

TC:

So does that mean ve can ask you
ansver the ones you want to answer?

DS:

Yes I have the right to stop at any time though.

TC:

Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that attitude
with us.

DS:

Well I ainft trying tc

TC:

Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who
has done what and who has done what to who. So I want the
truth out of you and I want it now.
Now do you understand
that?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Who were you with tonight

DS:

J.D.

TC:

Who else?

DS:

Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here,
do is call my mom and he vill be down here.

TC:

You vant your attorney?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you donft vant to talk to us?

DS:

Yes

TC:

O.K.

questions and

you vill

all you have to

Page 3
Interview with David Streeter
TC;

Do you recall earlier that .I had advised you of your rights?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And after being advised of
wanted to talk to a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Now is it your desire and you come
you want to talk to me now?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you want to talk to me without a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Go ahead*

DS:

Just tell the story.

TC:

Tell the story.

DS:

O.K. we was just coming home from that party...

TC:

Now hold on, you say "ve" who is "we".

DS:

It was me and Bart in the car-. ,In :his car.,

TC:

Now does Bart go 'by Kevin.

DS:

Yes

TC:

And who's car is that?

DS:

Bart's car, and some guy, he had his briahts
and that guy in front of us.

TC:

Which direction were you going?

DS:

West

TC:

So you were going West on?

DS:

On 41, so^ then-he--pulled over-and. let us go ahead of him and*
then" he' pulled- behind- us~ and- turned- his brights "on'!
So we—pulled over - and- let - him go in front of«-us—>and we-^
•pulled-down the.. street~andr then-he-started toget out-of his*

your rights you

said that

you

forth voluntarily that

on, Bart did,

Page 4
Interviev vith David Streeter
car and so ve jumped out of our
and I smacked the window.

car and he got back in his

TC:

With vhat?

DS:

My hand, and then (inaud)

TC:

You donft knov vho they vere?

DS:

No

TC:

Did you ever kick the car?

DS:

No, I didn't kick the car.
And then he drove away and then
ve vas going back to my house and ve drove by '41 and ve got
back from 41 and vent to 72 and he. vas at the 7-11 and he
started saying shit to us so— ve pulled over vent back and
walked up to him.

TC:

So after the occurrence of hitting the car and kicking the
car, then he left. Then you left right after him?

DS:

No, about 5 minutes.

TC:

So, on your vay to your house you sav.

DS:

Yes, ve got back on 41 and he vas at the 7-11.

TC:

You sav the station .vagon..at_the 7-11?

DS:

.Yes,, and they started yelling- shit at us*

TC:

Which 7-11 vere you at?

DS:

The one on 4100 and 6400.

TC:

So you drove by and you sav the car there?

DS:

And he started yelling shit at us and so ve pulled over and
walked up there.

TC:

Where did you pull over at?

DS:

Just on 4100.

TC:

So you didnft pull into the 7-11 parking lot?

DS:

And he had a hammer and he. said "Nov I can kick your guys
ass", something to that effect. So he vas coming at us and
so I picked a rock..up. and threv it at him.

Paqe 5
Interview with David Streeter
TC:

Hov big was the rock?

DS:
BS:

Just a little bigger than a golf ball.
Bigger that a golf ball and smaller than a soft ball?

DS:

Xes; a lot
baseball.

TC:

So you picked up a rock, where did you get the rock from?

DS:

Just on the ground, I just reached down and grabbed it.

TC:

And then you threw it and hit him in the head.

DS:

I guess it nit m m in the head, I don't know. ALJ L was
really going tc do. was scare him, try to get him to-bacK-. up
with the hammerc

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

cl guess he hit Bart with that hammer

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

Then the. girl jumped on me*.

TC:

What did they do?

DS:

Wrestled me to the. ground, and then I got up and:.I got that
guy off Bart and I said "let's get out of here".

TC:

Did you do anything else to that guy besides throw a rock at
him and hit him.

DS:

I might have-kicked hinr.

TC:

Where?

DS:

In the chest (inaud)

TC:

Was he laying on the ground when you did that?

DS:

He vas on top or sarr~

TC:

Did you do anything else.

DS:

No

TC:

You didn't hit him in the head and chest and you didn't grab
a rock and hit him in the head with a rock.

smaller

than

a

soft

ball,

smaller

than

a

Page 6
Interview with David Streeter
DS:

Oh, I .hit him when I threw that rock the first time.-

TC:

But you didn't hit him with a rock after that?

OS:

No

TC:

But you didn't hit him in the head.

OS:

No, (inaud)

TC:

Did you hit him with anything else?

OS:

No

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

We took off and went back to my house and sat there and
everybody was leavihc and Duscin-and-Roiuand_Nerd .theyL.va%
leavina. and_L auess they-went- to_the J. U to; get.gas* I
don't know*
We was all getting ready for bed and the next
thing you know Nerd-was!knocking, atl-the.door--;

TC:

Who is Nerd?

DS:

Nerd is Cody.

DS:

And he says
Dustin".

TC:

Down where?

DS:

The 7-11.

TC:

Which one?

DS:

3500 and 7200.

TC:

Go ahead.

DS:

So we ran down there-;...

TC:

Now you say "we", who is "we"?

DS:

Me and J.D.-and Nerd vas with us,

TC:

So Cody.

DS:

And that is all that was in the house.

TC:

What about Kevin?

"some

guy started

a

fight down

there

with

Page 7
Interview with David Streeter
DS:

9hr yes\, Bart too.

TC:

So you guys went down to the 7-11 to help Dustin out?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

There were tvo guys, chasing him. around the parking lot*

TC:
DS:

Chasing Dustin?
Yes and I don't know wnere Ron was. Ron wasn't helping him.
And the: one run UD-to Bart, Dusting was backing .upland .Bart.
walked up by him land one-grabbed.'.Bart and threw him against
.the car and Dustin came ftom-ground the side "£ him and•
punched him .and dropped him.

TC:

With one punch?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And he fell down on the ground and this
lot of 7-11.

DS:

Yes

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

Then the, other one had Jay by the hair and-so
there* and got him off and~ve just took "off-

TC:

Who kicked this guy on the ground?

DS:

I kicked him Dnce.

TC:

Where?

DS:

In the head.

TC:

Did you see anyone else kick him?

DS:

No

TC;

So after Dustin hit him and this guy fell down on the ground
you kicked him in the head?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you didn't see anyone else kick him?

was 'in the parking

we ran up*

Page 8
Interview with David Streeter
DS:

I was getting out of there, all I did was vent and got that
guy off Jay and ve iooJc off runnina baci ta mv tious^

TC:

Who is "ve"?

DS:

Me and Jay and .Bart> Bart was probably already at my house.
I just told them to get out of there.

TC:

Who had the gun?

DS:

Jay had a BE guir.

TC:

When did he get that?

DS:

Probably after ve vent back to the house/ I didn't even knov
he had it cause I took off, I vas getting out of there I
didn't vant nothing to do vith cops.

TC:

So you vent back to your house and did you guys come back to
the 7-11 again after J.D. got the gun?

DS:

No, the- Jeep came: up by my house- from the parking lot vith. a
crovbai and. vas going to kill Dustin,

TC:

From vhat parking lot?

DS:

Ream's, so ve all rar >vei there and

TC:

So you ran over to the Ream's parking lot to help Dustin?

DS:

Just to see vhat vas going on because all ve could hear vas
Dustin saying "he/s got a crowbar" or something.

TC:

And that's when J.D. had the gun.

DS:

Yes, cause vhen I got
gun.

TC:

Who's gun does that belong to?

DS:

It vas lay's.

TC:

Where is the gun now?

DS:

I have-no idea.

TC:

You don't knov vhat happened to it?

DS:

No, I vas getting out of there.
with it.

over there that is vhen J.D.

had the

I didn't want nothing to do

page s
Interview with David Streeter
TC: What did you see J.D. do with the gun, did you see him point
it at anybody?
OS:

He just had it in his hand, he didn't point it at anybody.

TC:

Did he point it at anybody, did he shoot at anybody?

DS:

No, it wasn't loaded (inaud)

TC:

Then after the altercation in the parking lot at Ream's what
happened?

DS:

That guy left
house*

TC:

So you didn't go back dovn by the 7-11 to check on this
other guy. So you don't knov what happened to him? But JCQXE
kicked him once in- the^head while ie- was >E :the-ground?

DS:

He was on .his way dovn:

TC:

Did you see anybody else kick him or hit him
how about Kevin?

DS:

The only time I saw Bart was when that guy had him up
against the car and Dustin smacked that guy and he was on
his was down and _I kicked him and that is the last time X
seen Kevin, (inaud)

TC:

Going back to the first incident at the 7-11
how many times* did you hit and kick that guy?

DS:

2 kicked lim one time and I don.'fc even think I hit him

TC:

JCou didn'tr hit him with your fist?

and then ve

left and ve

vent over to

Jay's

on the ground,

on 6400 West

DS: Ho:
TC:

So you only
head?

hit him once

DS:

I guess so

TC:

And then you kicked him in the head?

DS:

No

TC:

ffhere

DS:

Across the

d i d you kick him?
sLmJbLs-'

with a rock

and that was

in the

Page 10
Interview with David Streeter
TC:

Across the shoulder, was he
kicked him?

DS:

He was on too of Bart.

TC:

What did you see Bart do to him?

DS:

(inaud)
quick.

TC:

What did they do?

DS:

Just wrestled me down.

TC:

What did vou do to the airls?

DS:

Just Dushed them away and told them to back off.

TC:

rou didn't hit them with your fist or kick

DS:

No, I wouldn't hit a girl.

TC:

Xou didn't hit them with a rock.

DS:

No, that lady came after me with a hammer.

TC:

Did vou hit her„with a rock?

DS:

No

TC:

Did you throw. a - r o c J c a t her?

DS:

No

TC:

You a r e s u r e ?

DS:

I'm

I didn't

positive.

have a

laying on the

chance, them

ground when you

girls jumped

them?

on my

